Silvio
Seno Chibeni
> The Spiritist Paradigm (1)
Abstract:
This paper reviews briefly Kuhn’s
conception of science, in contrast with the traditional conception,
arguing then that Spiritism ¾ such as established by
Allan Kardec - constitutes a genuine scientific paradigm. It
is further claimed that the normal science tradition of the
Kardequian paradigm remains unrivalled as a scientific guide
to the study of the spiritist phenomena.
1. INTRODUCTION
Philosophy of science is the branch
of philosophy that treats of scientific knowledge: its foundations,
evolution, specificity, scope, etc. In the present work we shall
be particularly interested in the issue of the so-called “demarcation
criterion”. It is generally admitted that scientific knowledge
demarcates itself from other forms of knowledge by certain specific
features. To determine what, if any, these features are has constituted
a major challenge for philosophers, at least since the inception
of modern science, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In
his pioneering philosophical analysis of science, Francis Bacon
submitted that it was the adoption of a special method, the scientific
method, which differentiated science from non-science and pseudo-science.
In philosophy of science, the description of the scientific method
given by Bacon survived, with some alterations, until approximately
the middle of our century, and is still widely adopted by laymen
and scientists.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present in detail this
classical conception of science, as well as the historical and philosophical
criticisms that led to its abandonment. In broad outline, the traditional
view of science assumes that a scientific discipline begins with
a long process of pure observation. From the data thus collected
general laws governing the phenomena are then extracted. A scientific
theory is an ensemble of such laws, concerning a determinate field
of phenomena. Science progresses by the addition of new experimental
data and new laws to the existing theories.
In the view thus sketched, the following assumptions are essential:
1) No theoretical hypotheses whatsoever are allowed to intervene
in the data-collecting period: the observations should be theoretically
neutral. 2) Likewise, the laws should be extracted from the observational
basis by objective, theoretically neutral methods. 3) The new laws
discovered along the evolution of a science are always complementary
to, and never incompatible with, the laws already established.
The most rigorous elaboration of the classical conception of science
was undertaken by the philosophical programme called logical positivism,
which flourished from 1920 to 1940, approximately. This programme
reached a high level of formal and theoretical sophistication, and
exerted a profound and lasting influence upon the scientific community.
Already in 1934, however, the basic tenets of logical positivism
were vigorously attacked by a yet unknown philosopher, Karl Popper,
in a book that remained virtually ignored for more than two decades.
In the late fifties, when the logical positivist programme was already
weakened by a sustained process of self-criticism, and Popper’s
work was translated into English (The Logic of Scientific Discovery),
it became clear that the traditional view of science was no longer
tenable.
Here again we lack space to present the arguments levelled by Popper
against logical positivism, as well as his new conception of science,
known as falseationism. We remark only that the Popperian theses
run, in their turn, into severe difficulties, pointed out by several
philosophers of science, notably Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul
Feyerabend. [2]
We have discussed elsewhere (Chibeni 1984, 1988 and 1991) the issue
of the spiritist science in connection with Lakatos’s philosophy
of science. This same issue will be now analysed in the light of
the Kuhnian philosophical ideas. To be fully accomplished, however,
this undertaking would require a detailed exposition to the Kuhnian
and Kardequian theories, which evidently cannot be made within the
restricted limits of an article. The sequel should therefore be
taken only as an outline and invitation to further research. We
shall begin by reviewing some of the basic concepts and proposals
put forward by Thomas Kuhn.
2. A SKETCH OF THE KUHNIAN PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE
Kuhn began his academic career as
a theoretical physicist, and afterwards became interested in history
of science. Undertaking important historical research from the perspective
of a new historiographical tradition, according to which past scientific
theories should be analysed in their own scientific context, Kuhn
realised that the traditional conception of science did not at all
match with the actual process of genesis and evolution of the theories
of mature sciences (physics, chemistry). Such a perception of the
historical inadequacy of the current opinions concerning the nature
of science led him finally to philosophy of science. His studies
in this field were first published in a systematic way in his book
of 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which
had a profound influence on the development of philosophy of science.
In a language apparently accessible to the non-specialist, Kuhn
advances in this book several sophisticated epistemological theses
about scientific knowledge, that soon became object of hot debate
amongst philosophers. We cannot evidently enter into these technical
discussions here, but shall attempt at a simplified exposition of
some of the most widely accepted contributions of this American
philosopher.
Kuhn’s theory of science spins around the thesis that the
typical development of a scientific discipline occurs according
to the following open structure:
pre-paradigmatic phase ->
normal science -> crisis -> revolution -> new normal
science -> new crisis -> new revolution -> ...
The pre-paradigmatic phase represents,
so to speak, the “pre-history” of a science, that period
in which reigns a wide disagreement amongst the researchers, or
groups of researchers, about fundamental topics such as: what phenomena
should be explained, and according to which theoretical principles;
what are the relations of the theoretical principles one with another
and with theories of neighbouring domains; what methods and values
should guide the search of new phenomena and new principles; what
techniques and instruments can be utilised, etc. Whilst such a state
of affairs persists, the discipline cannot be said to be truly scientific.
A discipline becomes scientific when it acquires a scientific paradigm,
capable of putting an end to the generalised and deep-reaching disagreements
of its initial period. The term ‘paradigm’ has several
meanings in Kuhn’s book, and we cannot discuss its intricacies
here. In its original, pre-Kuhnian signification, the term means
‘example’, ‘model’, as used, for instance,
in grammar. Kuhn keeps part of this meaning when he proposes that
the transition to the scientific period requires the acknowledgement,
from the part of the community of researchers, of an exemplary scientific
achievement settling the issues at dispute in the pre-paradigmatic
phase. Aristotle’s mechanics, Newton’s optics, Boyle’s
chemistry, Franklin’s electricity theory are some of the examples
given by Kuhn of paradigms that promoted the respective disciplines
to the category of sciences.
It is not easy to explicit (specially in a few sentences) the elements
that form a Kuhnian paradigm. Kuhn even claims that such an explication
can never be complete, because the knowledge of a paradigm is partially
tacit, acquired by direct acquaintance with the way of
doing science determined by the paradigm. Thus, it is only by doing
optics in the way Newton did, or electromagnetism in the way Maxwell
did that one can know exactly the paradigms of Newtonian optics
and of electromagnetism, for instance. However, we can mention,
as integral parts of a paradigm: 1) an ontology, indicating the
kind of things which constitutes reality; 2) fundamental theoretical
principles, specifying the laws which regulate the behaviour of
these things; 3) auxiliary theoretical principles, establishing
the connections of the basic principles with the phenomena, as well
as with theories of contiguous domains; 4) methodological rules,
standards and values, directing the further articulation of the
paradigm; 5) concrete examples of application of the theory to the
facts, etc.
A paradigm provides then the foundations upon which the scientific
community works. It represents a “map” to be used by
the scientists in the exploration of Nature. Research firmly grounded
on the theories, methods and examples of a paradigm is called normal
science by Kuhn. Normal science aims to extend the knowledge
of the facts that the paradigm identifies as relevant, by further
elaboration of the theory and by more accurate observations.
Normal science is a highly directed and, in a sense, selective activity.
This is essential to the development of science, as Kuhn has shown.
It is only by focusing their attention on a selected range of phenomena
and explanatory theoretical principles that the scientists succeed
in going deep in the study of Nature. No scientific research is
possible without the guidance of a body of theoretical and methodological
principles: they allow the selection, understanding and evaluation
of what is observed. One of the main mistakes of the classical conception
of science was precisely the belief that the process of observation
can, and should, be theoretically neutral. It is acknowledged today
that facts and theories are closely interdependent. There is a kind
of “symbiosis” between them: facts give support to the
theories, and theories make possible their classification, concatenation,
prediction and explanation. Working under the direction of a paradigm
the scientist need not constantly reconstruct the foundations of
his field, explain the meaning and usefulness of the concepts he
uses, and justify the observations he chooses to make.
Kuhn describes normal science as a “puzzle-solving”
activity. It presupposes well-defined rules, like ordinary puzzles.
It may happen that along the development of a paradigm some of the
puzzles posed by Nature prove to be hard to solve. The scientists
duty is to insist in the rules and basic principles of the paradigm.
In the same way as in a jigsaw puzzle, for example, to cut off a
non-fitting edge of a piece is not a valid move, in normal science
the fundamental laws and standards should not be abandoned or mutilated
when a problem is tackled. Kuhn emphasises that as long as the paradigm
experiences no serious and generalised failures the scientists should
hold fast their commitment to the paradigm. The progress of science
requires that paradigms should not be too lightly abandoned. All
paradigms, specially in their initial periods, face difficulties,
and a certain amount of conservatism is necessary to give them time
to exhibit their full strength.
But this calculated tolerance should have a limit, of course. When
unsolved puzzles - called anomalies by Kuhn - do not yield
to the best efforts of the best scientists for a long time, and
furthermore strike on vital areas of the paradigm, the time is ripe
to considering the substitution of the whole paradigm. In such situations
of crisis, the most daring and creative members of the
scientific community come out with alternative paradigms. Once the
confidence on the dominant paradigm is lost, such alternatives become
appealing to a growing number of scientists. Discussions and disagreements
over fundamentals resembling those of the pre-paradigmatic phase
take place, with the difference that during a crisis the old paradigm
continues to guide research until a better paradigm is clearly at
hand.
When a new paradigm is finally adopted, science will have undergone
what Kuhn calls a scientific revolution. The most controversial
theses put forward by Kuhn concern scientific revolutions. For our
purposes here, however, we fortunately need not occupy ourselves
with this complex philosophical issue. The analysis of Spiritism
to be developed in the following section will hinge only on the
general schema of the nature of science reproduced above, which
is generally agreed by contemporary philosophers of science.
3. THE SPIRITIST PARADIGM
The reader acquainted with the history
of Spiritism and who has read, analysed and understood the contributions
of Allan Kardec will perhaps readily grant our two main theses:
Kardec’s work constitutes a genuine scientific paradigm, and
this paradigm represents till our days the only secure path along
which scientific research of spirit can be conducted. The complete
explication and justification of these claims would require a complete
exposition and analysis of Spiritism and of the alternative proposals
of study of the spiritist phenomena that have arisen since Kardec’s
time. Such an undertaking cannot evidently be carried out here.
We shall only indicate some salient points, in the hope of motivating
those who may wish to inquire further into this issue.
As Kardec himself repeatedly observed, some of the most conspicuous
facts that founded his research were already known, although imprecisely
and obscurely, since the earliest times of human civilisation. Notwithstanding
their having cast the interest of individuals and doctrines, until
the inception of Spiritism there was no scientific paradigm
capable of integrating them in an encompassing, precise and objective
theory. It was the pre-paradigmatic period of the spirit research.
Allan Kardec has put an end to this period. He proposed the first
well-grounded theory of the spiritist phenomena. Besides the explanatory
theory properly considered, Spiritism as formulated by Kardec provides
a set of methods, criteria and values to guide the development of
theory and experience. The Kardequian paradigm is admirably coherent
and encompassing, empirically adequate and heuristically fertile,
ranking, in its field, with the most successful paradigms of ordinary
academic sciences, such as thermodynamics, electromagnetism, relativity
and quantum theories, etc.
In an approximate indication, we can say that The Spirits’
Book establishes the ontology and the fundamental theoretical
principles of Spiritism. The Medium’s Book links
the theory with the experimental basis. The Gospel According
to the Spiritism and Heaven and Hell develop the philosophical
implications of the paradigm. The Genesis, Miracles and Predictions
According to the Spiritism and many essays published in the
Revue Spirite and in the Posthumous Works provide
in-depth analyses of several theoretical issues. The Revue
also represents a rich repository of experimental reports. Besides
the theory and methods of the spiritist science, Kardec offered
us a wealth of concrete examples of application of the theory in
the explanation of phenomena and in the resolution of long-lasting
philosophical problems concerning human nature. We can see, in consonance
with Kuhn’s ideas, that such puzzle-solving models play an
important role in the understanding of the real essence of Spiritism.
Those who have not delved into them will always be incapable of
a correct judgement of Spiritism. A purely “external”
view of the theory does not afford the important tacit knowledge
of the spiritist science. Oddly enough, the virtual totality of
the critics of Spiritism cannot even claim a perfunctory knowledge
of its theory.
It is very important to remark that the pioneering work of Kardec
does not represent a closed system, but the foundations from which
the spiritist science proceeds in its continuous advance. As it
is well known, the spiritist paradigm has been developed in important
respects by several researchers, in a solid tradition of normal
science. To mention just a few, Léon Denis and Gabriel Dellane
in earlier times, and later Bezerra de Menezes, Emmanuel, André
Luiz, Yvonne Pereira and Philomeno de Miranda have greatly contributed
to the extension and deepening of the spiritist paradigm, without
any violation of its fundamental principles and standards.
History of science indicates that revolutions have occurred in almost
all scientific disciplines. Someone may raise the question whether
the spiritist paradigm does not, or will not need to be replaced.
This is a rather complex issue, and limitations of space do not
allow us to analyse it thoroughly here. However, we would like to
sketch two considerations in this respect.
First, careful examination shows that Spiritism does not now experience,
and has never experienced any process of accumulation of anomalies.
As we have seen, in science this process is a pre-requisite for
the installation of crises and paradigm proliferation, and therefore
for scientific revolutions. Given this fact, it is easy to conclude
that all the attempts that have been made to create, in the name
of science, new lines of research of the spiritist phenomena are
methodologically premature and unjustifiable, contributing to hinder
rather than to promote the progress of knowledge.
Secondly, given the specific nature of the spiritist theory, one
should not expect that it will be superseded, at least in what concerns
its basic principles. Such principles are very close to the phenomenal
level, being therefore highly stable from a theoretical point of
view. Utilising a philosophical concept, one can classify the spiritist
theory as largely phenomenological. The most famous example
of a phenomenological theory in the academic sciences is thermodynamics,
which has developed in the mid nineteenth century, and has since
remained unaltered. It was not shaken when physics underwent the
great relativistic and quantum revolutions, which have radically
changed the conception of matter. This feature of thermodynamics
was very appealing to, amongst others, Einstein, who endeavoured
to develop his special relativity theory in phenomenological moulds.
In non-phenomenological theories - the so-called constructive
theories -, which form the largest part of physics and chemistry,
the degree of “theory” of the principles is much greater;
they are farther removed from the empirical level. The gap between
theory and observation is wider, and the confidence with which the
former can be asserted is correspondingly smaller, as there always
are several plausible alternative principles and theories for the
prediction and explanation of the same phenomena. The history of
physics and chemistry illustrates the vulnerability of their constructive
theories.
The fundamental principles of Spiritism, such as the existence,
pre-existence and survival of the spirit, the free-will and the
law of cause and effect, etc., are propositions belonging to the
same epistemic category as, for instance, the propositions that
fire burns and hemlock poisons, that Rome and the Sun exist. Their
confirmation depends neither on instruments nor on high-level risky
constructive theories whatsoever. This point has been analysed by
Allan Kardec himself.
Let us take an example. A man must be downright crazy not to conclude
the existence of a friend upon the receipt of a letter of hers commenting
details of their confidential relations, written in her typescript,
and containing her signature. Suppose now the friend is dead and
another letter of the very same kind is delivered, not by the ordinary
postman, but by a psychographic medium. What has changed from the
epistemological point of view? Nothing at all, and the same inference
can legitimately be drawn. Now it is facts and reasonings as straightforward
as these that form the scientific basis of Spiritism.
The class of phenomena that gave rise, and uphold directly the spiritist
paradigm is very broad, including not only the above-mentioned psychographic
communications but also psychophony (oral spirit communication),
xenoglossy (expression in unknown languages), materializations of
spirits and objects, sight and hearing of spirits and things belonging
to the spiritual world, and many others. Besides these specific
phenomena (the spiritist phenomena), Spiritism explains,
and is therefore confirmed, by numberless ordinary phenomena concerning
human psychic, physiological and moral characteristics such as sentiments
and inclinations, sympathies and antipathies, some remarkable occurrences
of our lives, psychosomatic effects, psychic pathologies, etc. Those
who have been attempting to formulate non-spiritist sciences of
the spirit almost invariably overlook this vast body of evidence
in favour of Spiritism. Worse, even the variety of spiritist phenomena
is not taken into account, and much less explained by a coherent
and heuristically powerful theory.
We have shown elsewhere (Chibeni 1988; see also 1986) that Allan
Kardec had a philosophical sense that was much ahead of his time.
He has correctly identified the features of a genuine science, and
carried his research accordingly. This claim is upheld by both the
inspection of his accomplishments and the many explicit passages
of his texts concerning the nature and the method of science. Contemporary
philosophy of science has overwhelmingly vindicated the Kardequian
analyses and procedures, showing where the true science of spirit
really is.
REFERENCES
CHALMERS, A.F. What is this Thing called Science? St.
Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1978.
CHIBENI, S.S. Espiritismo e ciência. Esboço
de uma análise do Espiritismo à luz da moderna filosofia
da ciência. Reformador, May 1984, pp. 144-7 e 157-9.
----------. Os fundamentos da ética espírita.
Reformador, June 1985, pp. 166-9.
---------- . Por que Allan Kardec ? Reformador, April
1986, pp. 102-3.
----------. A excelência metodológica
do Espiritismo. Reformador, November 1988, pp. 328-33 and December 1988,
pp. 373-8.
----------. Ciência espírita. Revista
Internacional de Espiritismo, March 1991, pp. 45-52.
FEYERABEND, P.K. Against Method. London, Verso, 1978.
KARDEC, A. Le Livre des Esprits. Paris, Dervy-Livres.
O Livro dos Espíritos. Transl. Guillon Ribeiro, 43 ed., Rio de
Janeiro, Federação Espírita Brasileira.
----------. L'Évangile selon le Spiritisme. Rio de Janeiro, Federação
Espírita Brasileira, 1979. O Evangelho segundo o Espiritismo.
Transl. Guillon Ribeiro. 87 ed. Rio de Janeiro, Federação
Espírita Brasileira.
----------. Le Ciel et l'Enfer. Farciennes, Éditions de L'Union
Spirite, 1951. O Céu e o Inferno. Transl. Manuel Quintão.
28 ed. Rio de Janeiro, Federação Espírita Brasileira.
----------. La Genèse, les Miracles et les Prédictions
selon le Spiritisme. Paris, La Diffusion Scientifique. A Gênese,
os Milagres e as Predições segundo o Espiritismo. Transl.
Guillon Ribeiro, 23 ed., Rio de Janeiro, Federação Espírita
Brasileira.
----------. Oeuvres Posthumes. Paris, Dervy-Livres, 1978. Obras Póstumas.
Transl. Guillon Ribeiro, 18 ed., Rio de Janeiro, Federação
Espírita Brasileira.
KUHN, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2 ed., enlarged.
Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1970.
LAKATOS, I. Falsification and the methodology of scientific
research programmes. In: Lakatos & Musgrave 1970, pp. 91-195.
LAKATOS, I. & MUSGRAVE, A. (eds.) Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
POPPER, K.R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 2 ed.,
revised. London, Hutchinson, 1968.
_________________________________________________________
[1] This text is the
English version, prepared by the Author with some modifications, of
the article “O paradigma espírita”, published in
the official journal of the Brazilian Spiritist Federation, Reformador,
June 1994, pp. 176-80, and is here reproduced with the kind permision
of the editor. This version appeared first in print in Human Nature,
vol. 1, n. 2, pp. 82-87, January 1999.
[2] The most representative works of these philosophers
are Kuhn 1970, Lakatos 1970 and Feyerabend 1978. For a simple exposition
of their main ideas, in contrast with the traditional and Popperian
views, see Chalmers 1978.
Fonte: http://www.geeu.net.br/artigos/paradigm.htm
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